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This paper argues that internal contradictions arising from the inability of the post-
Independence Indian state to introduce the institutional changes and adopt the interventions
needed for successful import-substituting industrialisation, had resulted in a crisis in that
growth strategy by the mid-1960s. Yet the transition to neoliberalism occurred only after a
decade-and a half, and in accelerated fashion only after two decades. The paper would trace
this lag to the timing of changes in the international financial system that was a prerequisite for
liberalization. It would argue that once the transition occurred and gained momentum India
emerged as a successful instance of neoliberal growth because of the foundations created in the
import substituting years, her fortuitous ability to avoid severe balance of payments and finan-
cial crises, and the human face which governments were forced to adopt given the compulsions
of democracy in a populous country with significant poverty. 
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Over the last two decades or more, the developing world has shifted out of
development strategies involving a highly interventionist and often develop-
mentalist state to one that has been widely characterised as a neoliberal strategy.
Neoliberalism is of course an ambiguous and loosely defined term, even when
restricted to the economic sphere. So it would be useful to clarify the sense in
which it is being used in this context. In what follows, neoliberal theory and
practice are taken as referring to: (i) the use of the rhetoric of market fundamen-
talism, in which the market or ostensibly “free economic exchange” is presented
as the most efficient mechanism to work the economic system, to pave the way
for the increasingly unfettered functioning of private capital, both domestic and
foreign; (ii) the use of the notion of a minimalist state, to be realised by disman-
tling its developmentalist version, to legitimise the shift of various terms of trade
and mechanisms of distribution in favour of the owners of capital and their
functionaries and conceal the conversion of segments of the state apparatus into
sites for primitive accumulation; and (iii) the pursuit of a regime of accumula-
tion where the home market and deficit-financed state expenditure are replaced
by exports and debt-financed private expenditure as the principal stimuli to
growth.1
Despite a degree of commonality across developing countries with respect
to the transition to a neoliberal strategy, there is no unanimity on the factors
that accounted for this transition. Some attributed it to “government failure.”
That is the very idea that the state would be able to garner adequate informa-
tion, ensure that there are no agency problems and successfully direct develop-
ment was brought into question. Others saw a neoliberal strategy as being more
“efficient” in the allocation of resources and therefore capable of ensuring sus-
tained growth, unlike the interventionist alternative. Yet others see the transition
not as result of some objective choice among alternatives, but as reflective of
changes in the relative strengths of different classes.
In what follows, this paper examines India’s post-Independence develop-
ment experience to identify the factors that led to the failure of interventionist,
import-substituting strategies, assess the options that were available in the con-
text of that failure and understand why “neoliberalism” emerged as the pre-
ferred alternative. Post-independent India was one of the classic cases of State-
led economic development. Not only was the State highly interventionist, but
over time the economy included a sizeable public sector, especially in areas of
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ven, mass consumption market at home, and dependence on finance limits deficit-financed, public
expenditure.
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infrastructure and basic industries. The “mixed” economy which thus came into
being within the political framework of a parliamentary democracy made the
Indian experiment novel and unique and the Indian industrialization strategy
was seen as a model for other developing countries with a reasonably-sized
home market.
State intervention, especially after the mid-1950s, attempted to influence
the pace and pattern of industrialization by: (i) insulating the domestic market
from excessive import competition, (ii) regulating the inflow of foreign capital
and mediating the interaction of domestic  and foreign capital; (iii) investing in
infrastructure, basic and heavy industries and closing gaps that may not be filled
by private players because of lumpy investments, long gestation lags and uncer-
tain profits; (iv) using controls on capacity creation and production and the tax-
cum-subsidy regime to influence the allocation of investment; and (v) putting in
place a regulatory regime that attempted to reduce industrial concentration and
ensure a more regionally dispersed industrial sector.
Given this background, India’s transition in 1991 to a liberal and open
industrial policy regime was an event of great historical significance. The ques-
tion as to why and how the transition occurred, the effect it had on the pace and
pattern of industrial growth, and employment generation and distribution are
still being debated. This paper attempts to trace the evolution of India’s industri-
alization since Independence, to partly explain the transition and to assess the
impact of alternative policy regimes on the pace and pattern of growth.
There are two alternative ways of periodizing industrialization during the
six decades since Independence: in terms of episodes of growth and decelera-
tion; and in terms of the policy regime in place.  The former warrants dividing
the whole period into three phases: (i) the immediate post-Independence years
stretching from 1950 to 1964, when Indian industry grew at creditable rates
compared both with earlier phases of industrialisation and with the pace of
industrialization in many similarly placed developing countries; (ii) the period
from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s referred to as one of ‘secular stagnation’
when compared to the preceding phase; and (iii) the years since the 1980s when
growth has not only risen on average and remained high for a relatively long
period of time, but showed signs of further acceleration after 2002. (Table 1)
When seen in terms of policy, we can speak of three phases, two of which
coincide with the growth-based periodization, and one that does not. The first
was the period of dirgisme, with a highly interventionist State leading develop-
ment between the early 1950s and the middle of the 1960s. In the second
phase—the middle of the 1960s to the end of the 1980s—interventionism
remained in place, but because of evidence that intervention had not been
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implemented as originally planned and had therefore not managed to realise its
multiple objectives it was losing its legitimacy. This triggered a contradictory
phase in policy where the strengthening of some measures of intervention was
accompanied by a creeping process of limited liberalization. Finally, the third
phase began in 1991-92 when, in the wake of the balance of payments crisis of
1991, the government opted for an accelerated process of liberalization.
India’s transition in 1991, initially through a programme of “structural
adjustment”, entailed a regime of “liberal imports”, substantial dilution of regu-
lations governing foreign investment, a progressive removal of administrative
controls, a strictly limited role for public investment, the privatisation of pub-
licly-owned assets over a wide field, the easing of capital controls and domestic
financial liberalisation that did away with targeted lending at differential interest
rates. Underlying this transition was a changed international conjuncture.
To say this is not to whitewash the fundamental flaws of the dirigiste
regime, or to gloss over its basic contradictions, but merely to avoid making
facile judgements about it. Both the advocates of neo-liberal reform and its crit-
ics trace the transition to the factors leading up to the development impasse of
the late 1960s and 1970s in India. This was a period when growth decelerated
substantially relative to that recorded during the first fifteen years after
Independence. This deceleration was not accidental or exogenously determined.
Going behind the socialist rhetoric of the 1950s, it is clear that there were a
number of features of India’s post-Independence growth strategy that struc-
turally limited the potential of the system. To start with, despite talk of land
reform, of providing “land-to-the-tiller” and curbing the concentration of eco-
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Table 1. Annual Trend Rates of Growth of Output
Total Manufacturing Mining& Quarrying Electricity
1950-51 to 64-65 (a) 7.2 7.1 5.9 13.6
1965-66 to 79-80 (b) 4.7 3.8 6.9 6.2
1965-66 to 74-75 (b) 4.3 2.7 9.4 3.8
1975-76 to 84-85 (c) 4.9 4.3 6.6 7.3
1985-86 to 94-95 (d) 6.2 6.2 4.2 8.3
1995-96 to 04-05 (e) 5.5 5.8 2.7 5.0
2000-01 to 06-07 (e) 7.3 7.9 4.0 4.8
Notes: a) Based on series with base 1950-51 =100; b) Based on series with base 1970 =100; c)
Based on series with base 1970 =100; d) Based on series with base 1980-81 =100; e) Based on series
with base 1993-94 =100.
Source: Computed from figures on Index of Industrial Production reported in Reserve Bank of
India (1961; 1971; 1981; 1991; 1995; 2009).
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nomic power, little was done to attack or redress asset and income inequality
after Independence. The worst forms of absentee landlordism were done away
with, but the monopoly of land remained intact in most of rural India. And
while some monopolistic practices were curbed, asset concentration in the
industrial sector was never really challenged. Rather, India’s monopolists were
able to use state intervention as a device to consolidate and expand their
monopolistic positions.
One consequence of the persistence of asset and income inequality was that
there were definite limits to the expansion of the market for mass consumption
goods in the country. Employment and income growth in the private sector was
limited. And the large mass of peasantry, faced with insecure conditions of
tenure and often obtaining only small shares of the outputs they produced, had
neither the means not the incentive to invest. The prospect of increasing pro-
ductivity and incomes in rural India (which was home to the majority of its
population) in order to stimulate domestic demand was therefore restricted.
The absence of any radical land redistribution meant that the domestic market,
especially for manufactured goods, remained socially narrowly based. It also
meant that the growth of agricultural output, though far greater than in the
colonial period, remained well below potential. 
Under these circumstances, continuous growth in State spending was
essential for the growth of the market since it was the key element in whatever
overall dynamism the system displayed. Further, given the strength and
assertiveness of the domestic industrial capitalists, the government was not in a
position to discipline them to the extent that would have been required to
launch an East Asian style mercantilist strategy of export-led growth.   The stim-
ulus for growth had to be internal, even though the autonomous expansion of
the domestic market was constrained by the inequality of asset distribution.
In the event, the basic stimulus to growth during the early post indepen-
dence years came from the State itself. It provided domestic capitalists with a
large once-for-all market for manufactures by widening and intensifying trade
protection and displacing imported goods from the domestic market. It sought
to expand that market through its current and capital expenditures and it sup-
ported the domestic capitalist class by investing in crucial infrastructure sectors
and channelizing household savings to finance private investment through the
creation of a number of industrial development banks.
This strategy did pay dividends during the decade and a half immediately
following Independence. In this period rates of industrial growth were cred-
itable by international standards. India built up a diversified industrial base, and
the public sector expanded rapidly enough to provide crucial infrastructural ser-
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vices, industrial raw materials and capital goods to sustain industrial growth
even when the foreign exchange available to import these commodities was lim-
ited (Chakravarty, 1987). By the mid-1960s, however, not only was the once-for-
all stimulus offered by import substitution exhausted, but the ability of the State
to continue to provide the stimulus to growth was also undermined by its
inability to raise adequate resources. In consequence, aggregate growth deceler-
ated leading to the “secular stagnation” of the late-1960s and 1970s.  
There were three mutually reinforcing and interrelated contradictions that
aborted the objectives of this basic model.   First, the state within the old eco-
nomic policy regime had to simultaneously fulfil two different roles that were
incompatible in the long run. On the one hand it had to maintain growing
expenditure, in particular investment expenditure, in order to keep the domestic
market expanding. At the same time, however, the state could not mobilise ade-
quate resources through taxation and the exchequer was a medium through
which large-scale transfers were made to the private sector, so that the state
effectively became the most important instrument for primary accumulation by
the domestic capitalist class in its various manifestations.
This contradiction between these two different roles of the state was mani-
fested in the government’s revenue account. This was in surplus until the end of
the 1970s, but thereafter turned to growing deficit, despite increasing resort to
indirect taxation and hikes in administered prices. The implications of this
growing fiscal crisis were obvious: the government could either cut back on its
own investment or maintain it through increased borrowing. The period from
the mid 1960s to the late 1970s witnessed the first option being chosen, while
from the early 1980s the second option was dominant. But such government
borrowing, and the subsequent increase in public debt, in turn generated pres-
sure for changes in economic strategy.
The second contradiction lay in the inability of the state to impose a mini-
mum measure of discipline among the capitalists, without which no capitalist
system anywhere can generate sustained growth. One consequence was, for
example the failure of domestic capitalists to diversify from serving the protect-
ed and lucrative domestic market to the competitive export market in order to
earn a part of the foreign exchange expenditure their activities entailed. This
absence of a collective discipline in turn meant that a successful transition could
not be made from the Nehruvian-style interventionist regime to an alternative
viable capitalist regime with a different kind of state intervention, such as in
Japan and South Korea, where state intervention was based on close collabora-
tion between the state and capital, and the simultaneous enforcement of fairly
rigorous discipline among the capitalists. This meant that the only feasible alter-
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native to the earlier dirigisme instead became a process of deregulation and lib-
eralisation. 
The third contradiction had its roots in the social and cultural ambience of
a developing country like India. Metropolitan capitalism has been characterised
by continuous product innovation, with newer goods constantly entering the
market and even creating new lifestyles.  But in India, as we have seen, the mar-
ket for industrial goods was limited from the early stages, with additional pur-
chasing power dominantly accruing to a comparatively narrow social segment
which in turn provided the main source of growth in demand for manufactured
consumer goods. This social segment, as in most other such developing coun-
tries, was eager to emulate the lifestyles and consumption patterns of the metro-
politan centre. Therefore it was not satisfied with having more domestically pro-
duced goods; rather, its demand was increasingly for the new goods produced in
the metropolitan centres, which could not be locally produced using only
indigenous resources and technology.
This created an imbalance between the possibilities of domestic production
and the patterns of domestic demand, since much of the additional demand for
consumer goods came from richer social groups. While this was sought to be
contained to some extent by import controls, such controls inevitably gave rise
to clandestine imports. In any case, this basic imbalance increased over time
because of further innovations in the metropolitan economies. This created
powerful and growing pressure among the more affluent groups in society for a
dismantling of controls on both domestic production and imports, regardless of
the effects on the balance of payments and erosion of the viability of the domes-
tic manufacturing sector. The international demonstration effect has been a
powerful instrument in the hands of metropolitan capital in its efforts to prise
open the markets of developing countries, and India is no exception.
The net result of the working out of all these contradictions has been evi-
dent in the Indian economy for quite some time. Changes in the rate of growth
of manufacturing production over the decades provide a barometer of the pos-
sibilities of productive accumulation. In the period 1951 to 1965, manufacturing
output grew at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent, but the subsequent 15
years (1965-80) saw this rate fall to only 3.8 per cent. By the first half of the
1980s, manufacturing growth was slightly higher at an annual rate of 4.3 per
cent, but in the decade beginning 1985-86 it touched 6.2 per cent and after a
deceleration immediately thereafter rose again to 7.9 per cent during 2000-01
and 2006-07. Thus, after 15 years of rapid industrial expansion in the 1950s and
the early 1960s, there was a dramatic decline in the rate of manufacturing
growth during the next 15 years. Even though the growth-rate picked up some-
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what in the early 1980s, it was still nowhere near the rates witnessed in the first
15 years of planning. It is only after the mid-1980s that a pronounced boom
occurred once again in Indian manufacturing.
The fact that the 15 years after the mid-1960s which were characterised by a
relative stagnation in manufacturing output also witnessed a decline in the rate
of growth of public investment is well-known. This decline meant, as discussed
earlier, that in promoting primary accumulation of capital, the state could not
adequately fulfil its other role of expanding the domestic market. This adversely
affected a number of industries which catered to mass consumption or those
with strong linkages to public investment. In addition, the sluggish rate of public
investment added to infrastructure constraints upon private economic activity.  
These were the factors that underlay the development impasse of the late-
1960s and 1970s. Any effort on the part of the state to accelerate growth through
deficit-financed expenditures either resulted in inflation or in a balance of pay-
ments problem, or in a combination of the two. The state was constrained to
avoid both of these outcomes beyond a certain limit.
The 1980s Recovery
Since this feature of Indian political economy did not change subsequently,
the revival of growth in the 1980s appears puzzling at first glance. The return to
economic buoyancy cannot be attributed to the emergence of any new source of
stimulus to growth. Exports during these years were by no means remarkable
enough to stimulate growth in an economy as large as that of India. And the fac-
tors which had earlier constrained the expansion of the mass market were still
operating. This implied that the stimulus to growth, as before, had to come
from the state (Chakravarty, 1987; Patnaik, 1995).
And this is essentially what happened. There were three new features which
characterized the 1980s, which allowed the economy to escape from the growth
impasse of the earlier period. First, there was a big increase in the fiscal stimulus
to the economy provided by government spending. Second, there was substan-
tial liberalization of imports, especially of capital goods and components for
manufacturing. Third, associated with both of these, there was a shift to relying
on external commercial borrowing by the state to finance the increases in the
consequent fiscal and current account deficits. 
In terms of fiscal stimulus, there was a significant increase in the total fiscal
deficit as a share of national income. The gross fiscal deficit of the central and
state governments together averaged 9.5 percent of GDP at current market
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prices in the second half of the 1980s and touched 10.1 percent in 1990-91. This
was not due to any increase in the share of public investment, but largely the
result of a decline in the share of public savings, reflected in the burgeoning rev-
enue deficit (which rose from an average of 2.8 percent of GDP during 1985-86
to 1989-90 to 4.5 percent in 1990-91). Current expenditures of the State grew at
a rate which outstripped by far the growth in tax and non-tax revenues, despite
hikes in indirect taxation and in administered prices. 
The second new feature was the liberalization of imports of capital goods
and components required for a number of commodities catering to luxury con-
sumption, especially of electronics and automobiles. This was based on the
argument—explicitly stated by some government officials—that since even the
small segment of the population that demanded such goods amounted in
absolute terms to a fairly large number, the economy could grow on the basis of
such an industrialization strategy whose benefits would eventually “trickle
down” to the poorer sections of the population as well.
The import liberalization of the late 1980s was not tied to a larger export
effort; its main immediate thrust was towards producing more goods—luxury
goods —for the domestic market. In 1985-86, the very first year that the policy
was introduced, there was a dramatic increase in balance of payments deficits,
with the current account deficit increasing to 2.26 percent of GDP. While it
reached a plateau thereafter, this still reflected a very large increase in non-oil
imports, since there was a significant reduction in India’s oil import bill between
1984-85 and 1988-89 owing to the development of the Bombay High oilfield.
But for the import profligacy, the trade deficit would have declined significantly
in absolute terms since mineral oil and related products accounted for nearly a
third of India’s import bill at the start of the 1980s.
Meanwhile, remittance inflows during this period had flattened out and
“soft loans” were becoming more and more difficult to come by. In this context,
the maintenance of a high, even though steady, absolute level of the trade deficit,
and the related need to finance large current account deficits, turned out to be
an extravagance that could not be sustained. It should be noted that more than
40 per cent of the increase in import value between 1984-85 and 1988-89 (bar-
ring what was effectively re-exported) was on account of machinery and trans-
port equipment, including components, which went to a significant extent into
the production of a variety of goods for upper income groups. 
The third new feature was a systematic resort to commercial borrowing
from abroad. As the trade and current account deficits went up in the latter half
of the 1980s, and access to soft loans dwindled, there was increasing recourse to
external commercial borrowings. This in turn contributed, with a lag, to large
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current account deficits because of the need for debt servicing, and eventually
necessitated further borrowing. Debt has a habit of escalating rapidly, feeding
upon itself. As fresh debt was contracted even to pay off old debt, the terms at
the margin became stiffer, the maturity period shorter and hence the rate of
escalation of debt increased as well. The debt in dollar terms nearly quadrupled
during the 1980s, from around $20 billion in 1980 to nearly $82 billion in 1990;
debt to banks and private individuals increased more than 10 times from just
under $2 billion to more than $22 billion. By 1990, India’s debt-service pay-
ments absorbed foreign exchange amounting to nearly one-third of the value of
exports.2
It is the combination of these three features which explains the State’s abili-
ty to pull the economy out of the impasse it faced during the late 1960s and
1970s. Of course it can be asked why the earlier successive governments—which
were after all just as desperate to revive growth - could not adopt a similar strat-
egy. To answer this we need to look at developments outside the country, which
influenced India’s medium-term growth prospects significantly. The rise to
dominance of finance capital in the international economy was the most impor-
tant of such developments.
Changed International Conjuncture
Until the early 1970s, the private international financial system played only
a limited role in recycling financial surpluses to the developing countries.
Capital flows to developing countries, barring a few unusual exceptions like
South Korea, were through official bilateral and multilateral channels. The peri-
od immediately after the first oil shock saw a dramatic change in this scenario.
Since oil surpluses were held mostly as deposits with the international banking
system based in and controlled by the developed world, the private financial sys-
tem there became a powerful agent for recycling surpluses. This power was
immense. The expenditure that was fuelled by such credit in both the developed
and developing worlds generated further surpluses with the oil producers, who
then deposited these surpluses with the transnational banks, who, in turn, could
offer further doses of credit. By 1981, OPEC countries are estimated to have
accumulated surpluses to the tune of $475 billion, $400 billion of which was
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parked in the developed industrial nations. 
This power of finance was all the more significant because a slowdown in
productivity growth in metropolitan industry was already bringing the postwar
industrial boom to a close, and this process was being hastened by the contrac-
tionary response to the oil shocks. As a proportion of world output, net interna-
tional bank loans rose from 0.7 per cent in 1964 to 8.0 per cent in 1980 and 16.3
per cent in 1991. Relative to world trade, net international bank loans rose from
7.5 per cent in 1964 to 42.6 per cent in 1980 and 104.6 per cent in 1991 (World
Bank, various issues).
Two other developments contributed to the increase in international liq-
uidity during the 1970s and 1980s. First, the United States had built up large
international liabilities during the Bretton Woods years, including those result-
ing from expenditures on the Vietnam War and its policing efforts elsewhere in
the world. The explosion of the Eurocurrency market in the 1970s reflected this.
This was sustained by the confidence in the dollar stemming from the immedi-
ate post-War hegemony of the US, which made it as good as gold. Such interna-
tional confidence in its currency allowed the US to ignore national budget con-
straints on its international spending and resulted in an expansion of liquidity in
international financial markets.
Second, the changing demographic structure in most of the advanced
countries, with baby boomers reaching the age when they would emphasize per-
sonal savings for retirement. This was accentuated by changes in the institution-
al structures relating to pensions, whereby in most industrial countries, public
and private employers tended to fund less of the planned income after retire-
ment, requiring more savings input from employees themselves. All this meant
growing demand for more variety in savings instruments as well as higher
returns, leading to the greater significance of pension funds, mutual funds and
the like in financial markets. 
The resulting massive increase in international liquidity found banks and
non-bank financial institutions desperately searching for the means to keep
their capital moving. At first, there were booms in consumer credit and housing
finance in the developed industrial nations. But when those opportunities
petered out, a number of developing countries were discovered as the “emerging
markets” of the global financial order. Capital in the form of debt and equity
investments began to flow into these countries, especially those that were quick
to liberalize rules relating to cross-border capital flows and regulations govern-
ing the conversion of domestic into foreign currency.
From the point of view of governments in certain developing countries,
this growth in international finance appeared positive. Some of them needed the
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liquidity to finance their post-shock deficits. But for others, which were not will-
ing to undertake the structural reforms that would involve attacking the very
landed and industrial interests they represented, and were therefore stuck with-
out an alternative in the face of the development impasse after the 1960s, the
new situation appeared to offer a lifeline. They could now experiment with the
alternative of opening up their economies, integrating with world capitalism
and hope to derive at least some of the benefits of whatever growth occurred in
the world system. This was certainly true of India in this period.
This option did not exist earlier, since the very process of opening up
would have involved a rise in the current account deficit to levels not warranted
by their access to finance through the development aid network. The resulting
balance of payments problem would have necessitated an immediate reduction
in growth, ensured through a State-led deflation. Larger access to international
finance seemed to allow for the possibility of running larger current account
deficits, permitting the State to liberalize the economy and hope that in the
medium term this would trigger an increase in exports. Liberalization, which
was not a relevant option under the earlier international financial framework,
was all of a sudden a real and even attractive option.
Thus, this congruence of interests—of the developing countries to borrow
and the banks to lend—resulted in the fact that the current account deficit was
for almost a decade and a half no constraint on growth in at least some under-
developed countries. The fall-out of this scenario is now history. Right through
the 1970s and 1980s—and of course definitely by the 1990s—governments in
one developing country after another combined more liberal growth strategies
with huge budget deficits financed with international borrowing. This also
served to neutralize at least partly, the adverse effects on domestic growth that
trade liberalisation had. In fact, during those years many developing countries
actually recorded rather creditable rates of growth. Typically, these were then
attributed to liberalisation rather than to reckless pump-priming by domestic
governments, which the irresponsible lending practices of the international
banking system had in turn encouraged.3
Seen in this light, the revival of growth in India during the 1980s is far easi-
er to explain. Exploiting the access to foreign exchange that was afforded by the
rise to dominance of finance internationally, the government chose to pump-
prime the system. Rising government expenditure, however, was not accompa-
nied by an increase in resource mobilization through rising taxes. The fiscal
stimulus was financed through rising deficits, including a rising deficit on the
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revenue account of the government’s budget. The demand stimulus resulting
from such expenditure was serviced by domestic industry with the help of
imported capital goods, intermediates and raw materials, imports of which were
liberalized. This essentially meant that the import intensity of domestic produc-
tion rose. But such growth was not constrained by inadequate access to foreign
exchange, since it was accompanied by an increase in foreign borrowing from
the IMF, the international commercial banking system and non-resident
Indians. Fortunately for India, this was the time when remittances from Indian
workers, especially in the Gulf, to sustain the consumption expenditures of fam-
ilies left behind in the country, provided the country with a fortuitous inflow of
foreign exchange. Despite this, India’s foreign debt to GDP ratio doubled during
the 1980s. It was when international creditors chose to shut off such credit at the
end of the 1980s that India ran into the balance of payments crisis of 1990-91,
which provided the grounds for advocates of reform to push through an IMF-
style stabilization and adjustment strategy.
The 1990s and After
If this was the set of factors that triggered the growth turn around in the
1980s, how did growth manage to remain high and even accelerate after the
1991 crisis. Annualised month-to-month rates of growth of the manufacturing
Index of Industrial Production indicate that after touching a trough in
September 2001, growth as captured by this index staged a medium term recov-
ery to peak at 17.6 per cent in November 2006 (Chart 2). Though there are signs
of a downturn in industrial growth since then, the period between 2001 and
2006, when formal employment in the organised manufacturing sector stagnat-
ed or declined, was one of accelerating, and on average high, growth. Going by
GDP estimates the Indian economy had moved on to a higher growth trajectory
during the years since 2003-04 with growth averaging close to 9 per cent per
annum. What the sectoral GDP estimates suggest is that this high growth char-
acterized the manufacturing sector as well. 
Taking a long view, we find that industrial growth as captured by the Index
of Industrial Production (IIP), which averaged 9 per cent in the second half of
the 1980s, slumped immediately after the balance of payments crisis of 1991.
However, a recovery followed, with manufacturing growth rising to a peak of
14.1 per cent over the three-year period 1993-94 to 1995-96. This led many to
argue that liberalization had begun to deliver in terms of industrial growth.  But
the boom proved short-lived, and industry entered a relatively long period of
From Dirgisme to Neoliberalism 
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much slower growth, with fears of an industrial recession being expressed by
2001-02.
Since then the industrial sector has once again recovered, with rates of
growth touching the high level s of the mid-1990s by 2004-05 (Chart 1). Even
though the peak of 1995-96 has not been equalled, growth was creditable and
sustained over the five years ending 2007-08.
An additional cause for comfort is that there appear to be significant differ-
ences between the mini-boom of the mid-1990s and what occurred recently.
The 1993-1995 “mini-boom” was the result of a combination of several once-
for-all influences. Principal among these was the release after liberalization of
the pent-up demand for a host of import-intensive manufactures, which
(because of liberalization) could be serviced through domestic assembly or pro-
duction using imported inputs and components. Once that demand had been
satisfied, further growth had to be based on an expansion of the domestic mar-
ket or a surge in exports. Since neither of these conditions was realized, industry
entered a phase of slow growth.
What was surprising, in fact, was that growth was not even lower.
Economic liberalization and fiscal reform were bound to adversely affect manu-
facturing growth. To start with, import liberalization results in some displace-











































Chart 1. Annual Rate of Growth of the Index of Industrial Production
Source: Computed from figures provided by Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation, Central Statistical Organisation. Available at http://mospi.nic.in/iip_
table3.htm. 
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ment of existing domestic production directly by imports and indirectly by new
products assembled domestically from imported inputs. Second, the reduction
in customs duties resorted to as part of the import liberalization package and
the direct and indirect tax concessions that were provided to the private sector
to stimulate investment, led to a decline in the tax-GDP ratio at the Centre by
between around 1.5 percentage points of GDP over the 1990s. This implied that
so long as deficit-spending by the government did not increase, the demand
stimulus associated with government expenditure would be lower than would
have otherwise been the case. Third, after 1993-94 the government also chose to
significantly restrict the fiscal deficit as part of fiscal reform. Success on this front
is a late 1990s phenomenon, when the stimulus provided to industrial growth
by state expenditure was substantially smaller than was the case in the 1980s.
These were among the factors that slowed industrial growth after the mid-
1990s.
If the stimulus to industrial growth was dampened after the late 1990s,
what explains the recent recovery in industrial growth? That recovery was in
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Chart 2. Month-to-Month Annualized Rates of Growth of Industrial Production
Source: Computed from figures provided by Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation, Central Statistical Organisation. Available at http://mospi.nic.
in/iip_table3.htm.
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large measure due to the increases in private consumption and housing invest-
ment resulting from two important developments. One is the much faster
increases in income in the top deciles of the population. It is known that these
do not get effectively reflected in consumption expenditure surveys and inequal-
ity calculations based on them, because these surveys inadequately cover the
upper income groups. Yet a comparison of the mean real per capita consump-
tion expenditure by decile groups indicates that the rate of growth of mean con-
sumption expenditure in the highest decile in both rural and urban areas rose
much faster than in the other decile groups. Moreover, not only did aggregate
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Table 2. Decile-wise Mean Consumption Expenditure at 1993-94, 1993-94 and 2004-05
Prices
Consumption deciles Mean Consumption
Growth (%)
RURAL 1993-94 2004-05
1 116.25 121.05 4.13
2 154.03 157.95 2.54
3 178.18 181.74 2.00
4 200.75 205.02 2.12
5 224.27 229.08 2.14
6 250.84 256.37 2.21
7 282.38 289.11 2.38
8 324.59 334.13 2.94
9 395.59 409.99 3.64
10 687.19 783.92 14.08
Total 281.40 296.84 5.48
URBAN
1 154.46 171.71 11.17
2 212.38 234.38 10.36
3 252.15 282.97 12.23
4 291.82 332.00 13.77
5 334.90 388.37 15.97
6 383.90 455.62 18.68
7 448.70 538.74 20.07
8 541.47 651.49 20.32
9 691.72 845.83 22.28
10 1268.80 1688.94 33.11
Total 458.04 559.01 22.04
Source: Computations based on National Sample Survey Organisation, Department of Statistics,
Government of India (1997; 2006).
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mean consumption expenditure in the urban areas increase at a rate (22 per
cent) much faster than in rural areas (5.5 per cent), but in the urban areas the
rates of growth of such expenditure in the top five deciles, (which ranged
between 19 and 33 per cent) was much higher than in lower five deciles
(between 10.4 and 16 per cent). This meant that there would have been some
diffusion of luxury consumption to those below the topmost deciles in the
urban areas.4 The other is the sharp increase in credit financed housing invest-
ment and consumption, facilitated by financial liberalization. Credit-financed
consumption and investment played an extremely important role in keeping
industrial demand at high levels. Credit served as a stimulus to industrial
demand in three ways. First, it financed a boom in investment in housing and
real estate and spurred the growth in demand for construction materials.
Second, it financed purchases of automobiles and triggered an automobile
boom. Finally, it contributed to the expansion in demand for consumer
durables.
An important point to note here is that even though there was a slowdown
in the flow of foreign loans to India after the 1991 crisis, the financial liberalisa-
tion that accompanied the adjustment process attracted capital in other forms
such as equity investments that contributed to liquidity in the system. Hence an
important way in which integration has influenced the process of growth in
India is its impact on the role played by credit in financing private consumption
and investment. Total bank credit grew at a scorching pace from 2005 onwards,
at more than double the rate of increase of nominal GDP. As a result, the ratio of
outstanding bank credit to GDP (which had declined in the initial post-liberali-
sation years from 30.2 per cent at the end of March 1991 to 27.3 per cent at the
end of March 1997) doubled over the next decade to reach about 60 per cent by
the end of March 2008. Thus, one consequence of financial liberalisation was an
increase in credit dependence in the Indian economy, a characteristic imported
from developed countries such as the USA. This increase in credit could appear
to be positive inasmuch as it reflected a greater willingness on the part of banks
to lend: the growth in credit out-performed the growth in deposits, resulting in
an increase in the overall credit-deposit ratio from 55.9 per cent at end March
2004 to 72.5 per cent at end March 2008. This increase was accompanied by a
corresponding drop in the investment-deposit ratio, from 51.7 per cent to 36.2
per cent, which indicates that banks were shifting away from their earlier conser-
vative preference to invest in safe government securities in excess of what was
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required under the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) norm (Data in this and the
subsequent four paragraphs are from Committee on Financial Sector
Assessment, 2009).
However, rapid credit growth meant that banks were relying on short term
funds to lend long. From 2001 there was a steady rise in the proportion of short-
term deposits with the banks, with the ratio of short term deposits (maturing up
to one year) increasing from 33.2 per cent in March 2001 to 43.6 per cent in
March 2008. On the other hand, the proportion of term loans maturing after
five years increased from 9.3 per cent to 16.5 per cent. While this delivered
increased profits, the rising asset-liability mismatch increased the liquidity risk
faced by banks.
These changes do not appear to have been driven by the commercial bank-
ing sector’s desire to provide more credit to the productive sectors of the econo-
my. Instead, retail loans became the prime drivers of credit growth. The result
was a sharp increase in the retail exposure of the banking system, with overall
personal loans increasing from slightly more than 8 per cent of total non-food
credit in 2004 to close to 25 per cent by 2008. Of the components of retail credit,
the growth in housing loans was the highest in most years. As Table 3 indicates,
the (new) private banks were the most enthusiastic adopters of such a strategy,
followed by foreign banks. 
This rapid increase in credit and retail exposure, with inadequate or poor
collateral, would have brought more tenuous borrowers into the bank credit
universe. A significant (but as yet unknown) proportion of this could be “sub-
prime” lending. According to one estimate, by November 2007 there was a little
more than Rs.400 billion of credit that was of sub-prime quality, defaults on
which could erode the capital base of the banks.  To attract such borrowers, the
banks offered attractive interest rates below the benchmark prime lending rate
(BPLR). The share of such loans in the total rose from 27.7 per cent in March
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Table 3. Personal Loans as per cent of Total Outstanding Credit of Commercial Banks
1996 2000 2007
State Bank of India and Associates 9.5 10.7 22.0
Other Nationalised Banks 9.1 10.9 15.8
Foreign Banks 8.8 17.1 24.8
Regional Rural Banks 10.5 18.8 20.5
Private Sector Banks 9.7 7.9 37.3
All Scheduled Commercial Banks 9.3 11.2 22.3
Source: Reserve Bank of India (1997-2008).
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2002 to 76.0 per cent at the end of March 2008. This increase was especially
marked for consumer credit and reflected a mispricing of risk that could affect
banks adversely in the event of an economic downturn.
The point to note is that compared to the mid-1990s the growth of credit
in recent years has been explosive, facilitated in part by the liquidity injected into
the system by the large inflows of foreign financial capital in the form of equity
and debt. In the wake of this increase in liquidity, expansion in credit provision
has been accompanied by an increase in the exposure of the banking sector to
the retail loan segment. The share of personal loans in total bank credit has dou-
bled in recent years rising from 12.2 per cent at end-March 2001 to 24.7 per cent
at end-March 2007.5 Much of this has been concentrated in housing finance,
with housing loans accounting for 51 per cent of personal loans in 2007. But
purchasers of automobiles and consumer durables have also received a fair share
of credit. The importance of credit-financed private consumption and invest-
ment for growth has been flagged in recent times by the Finance Ministry.
Despite being an ardent votary of financial liberalization and being committed
to a policy of minimal government intervention, it has often chosen to push
public sector banks into reducing interest rates every time there is any sign of a
slowing of credit growth. It is not non-intervention that liberalization involves,
but a form of intervention that uses the financial sector as means of stimulating
the demand needed to keep private sector growth going.
Another element of change in the factors contributing to industrial growth
during the current boom as opposed to that in the mid-1990s is the stimulus
provided by exports. In the early and mid-1990s high growth was accompanied
by high imports, with exports growing, if at all, in areas where India was tradi-
tionally strong. In recent years, the share of India’s traditional manufactured
exports such as textiles, gems and jewellery and leather in the total exports of
manufactures has declined, while that of chemicals and engineering goods has
gone up significantly. This would have stimulated growth. While exports are by
no means the principal drivers of manufacturing production, they play a part in
sectors like automobile parts and chemicals and pharmaceuticals where Indian
firms are increasingly successful in global markets.
All this suggests that Indian industry has been experiencing a transition.
While during the first four decades of development industrial growth was
almost solely dependent on the stimulus offered by government expenditure
and the support provided by public investment in infrastructure, there are signs
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that other sources of demand such as private consumption demand and exports
are playing an important role in recent times. Further, the recent industrial
buoyancy suggests that these new stimuli have, unlike during much of the
1990s, neutralized the adverse effects that import liberalization and fiscal con-
traction had on industrial growth.
The Pattern of Demand
The nature of the stimuli underlying recent industrial growth does have
implications for the pattern of demand. An important implication of debt-
financed manufacturing demand is that it is inevitably concentrated in the first
instance in a narrow range of commodities that are the targets of personal
finance. Commodities whose demand is expanded with credit finance vary from
construction materials to automobiles and consumer durables. These com-
modities, which serve or deliver products that can serve as the collateral for the
debt that finances their purchase, must be in the nature of durables and are
more-often than not the products of metal- and chemical-based industries and
therefore tend to be more capital intensive and are characterised by relatively
high productivity and high rates of growth of productivity.
Conventionally, the pattern of industrial growth is analysed on the basis of
the used-based indices of the Index of Industrial Production. This, however, is
not too enlightening because it just suggests that Basic, Intermediate and
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Goods Goods Goods Total Durables Non- Index
durables
Trend Rate of Growth 05.2 08.8 06.5 07.5 9.7 06.8 006.6
1993-94 to 2007-08
Weighted Contribution 01.9 00.8 01.7 02.1 0.5 01.6 006.6
to Aggregate Growth
Proportionate 28.1 12.3 26.1 32.4 7.9 24.1 100.0
Contribution to 
Aggregate Growth
Source: Computed from figures provided by Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation, Central Statistical Organisation. Available at http://mospi.nic.in/
iip_table6.htm (Index of Industrial Production, M/o Statistics and PI).
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Consumer Non-durable Goods each contributed about a quarter of the aggre-
gate industrial growth rate over 1993-94 to 1999-00, with Capital and Consumer
Durable Goods contributing the rest (Table 4). Since each of these sectors is very
diverse, it is difficult to infer much from this evidence about either the nature of
demand or its biases in terms of capital intensity.
A more disaggregated picture of the pattern of organised industrial sector
growth can be drawn based on movements in net value added at the three-digit
level in industries covered by the Annual Survey of industries (ASI). To adjust the
series for changes in prices, the three-digit level industries have been matched
with appropriate combinations of commodities covered in the series on
Wholesale Price Industries with base year 1993-94 published by the Office of the
Economic Adviser in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India.6 Where a perfect match for a particular three-digit industry group was not
available, price indices for three-digit groups have been arrived at by weighting
the index of each commodity within the group with the relative weight attached
to it in the WPI. Using these indices, figures on value added at the three-digit
level have been deflated to compute inflation-adjusted values for each year.
Figures on capital formation have been deflated in the case of all industries using
the implicit deflator for capital formation derived from the National Accounts
Statistics of the CSO. Analysis has been restricted to the period 1993-94 to 2003-
04 and to those three-digit industries for which data are available from the ASI
and price indices can be computed from the WPI series with 1993-94 as base.
One feature which emerges from the resulting series on net value added is
the wide variation in growth at the three digit level with high growth being con-
centrated in relatively few industries. Consider Chart 3 which gives the distribu-
tion of the trend rates of growth in the real net value added by 3-digit industry
groups in the registered manufacturing sector for the period 1993-94 to 2003-
04. It should be clear that there is wide variation in growth performance with a
few sectors recording remarkably high rates of growth, though data problems
may be exaggerating figures at the two tails.
One way of calculating the contribution of the fastest growing industries to
the overall rate of growth of these 52 three-digit level industries, is to multiply
the compound rate of growth in any particular three-digit industry (implicit in
the real net value added in 1993-94 and 2003-04) with the share of value added
in this industry relative to all 52 industries in the base year, and divide the result-
ing figure by the sum of the weighted growth rates of net value added all 52
industries. The top 3 growth contributing industries during the period 1993-94
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to 2003-04 accounted for 38 per cent of the growth in all industries, with the fig-
ure for the top 5 rising to close to 55 per cent, the top 10 to almost 75 per cent
and for the top 15 to almost 90 per cent. There were 39 industries that recorded
a positive rate of growth for this period. If we restrict our analysis to those
industries that registered a positive rate of growth over the period, the picture of
concentration still persists (Table 5). The top 3 growth contributors over the
period 1993-94 to 2003-04 accounted for more than a third of growth in all
industries with a positive rate of growth, with the figure for the top 5 rising to
close to 50 per cent, the top 10 to more than two-thirds and for the top 15 to
almost 80 per cent. This pattern of growth distribution characterised the two
sub-periods into which the whole period has been divided. 
Table 6 identifies the industries that fall in the category of highest growth
contributing industries. It should be clear that these consist largely of the metal
and chemical industries gaining from the credit financed construction and con-
sumption boom, including areas like automobiles, television receivers and com-
puting equipment. The leading sectors also include many chemical industries
that feed luxury consumption, like refined petroleum products. Finally, the
leaders include those industries that may have benefited from new export
opportunities such as iron and steel and chemicals. 
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Chart 3. Distribution of Rate of Growth of Net Value Added 3-Digit Industrial Groups (%)
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
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Table 5. Contribution of Fastest Growing Industries to the Aggregate Rate of Growth
Contr. to VA Gr Contr. to VA Gr Contr. to VA Gr 
1993-94-2003-04 1993-94-1998-99 1998-99-2003-04
Top 3 34.21 38.97 37.36
Top 5 49.00 47.66 52.50
Top 10 67.19 63.45 75.43
Top 15 79.12 74.40 85.60
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
Table 6. Three-Digit Industries with the Fastest Rates of Growth of Real Net Value
Added During 1993-94 and 2003-04
Code Industry Name
271 Manufacture of basic iron & steel
242 Manufacture of other chemical products
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals
359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.
269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles
291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery
272 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
289 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products; metal working service
activities
252 Manufacture of plastic products
300 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
251 Manufacture of rubber products
323 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or
reproducing apparatus, etc.
160 Manufacture of tobacco products
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
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Implications for Productivity
Thus, there appears to have been a shift in the pattern of demand that
results partly from the increases in income inequality that are associated with
more liberalized and open economic regimes, partly from the role of credit
financed consumption and partly from the effects of the kind of exports that
have been occurring in the more liberalised environment. Industries producing
commodities whose demand is driven by factors such as these, tend to be more
capital intensive and are characterised by relatively high productivity and high
rates of growth of productivity. Higher labour productivity is also the outcome
of the combination of import liberalization and rising inequality. This is because
(i) tastes and preferences of the elite in developing countries are influenced by
the “demonstration effect” of lifestyles in the developed countries, and therefore
new products and processes introduced in the latter very quickly find their way
to the developing countries when their economies are opened, and (ii) techno-
logical progress in the form of new products and processes in the developed
countries is inevitably associated with an increase in labour productivity, so that
increased imports of technology imply increased productivity. Hence after trade
liberalisation, labour productivity growth in developing countries is exogenous-
ly driven and tends to be higher than prior to trade liberalisation, leading to a
growing divergence between output and employment growth. Prabhat Patnaik
(2006) argues that for these reasons a combination of high output growth and
low employment growth is a feature characterising many developing countries
during the years when they opened their economies to trade and investment.
This lack of correspondence between output and employment growth
must be because average labour productivity in manufacturing has grown so
fast, that the effects of the higher rate of increase in output on employment
growth would have been more than neutralized. This indeed appears to be the
case. According to estimates quoted in the Planning Commission’s Eleventh
Plan Document, GDP per worker in manufacturing which grew at 2.29 per cent
per annum during 1983 to 1993-94 accelerated to 3.31 per cent between 1993-
94 and 2004-05 (Planning Commission, Government of India, 2008: 83). It is to
be expected that this acceleration would have been sharper in the case of orga-
nized manufacturing, because of the effects of reform.
This factor, together with the industrial “restructuring” associated with lib-
eralisation, has resulted in a sharp and persistent increase in labour productivity
(as measured by the net value added at constant prices generated per worker) in
the organised manufacturing sector during the years of liberalisation has been.
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As Chart 4 shows labour productivity rose more than two-and-a-half times
between the years 1981-82 and 1996-97, stagnated and even slightly declined
during the years of the industrial slowdown that set in thereafter, and has once
again been rising sharply in the early years of this decade.
There are two factors that would have contributed to this sharp increase in
labour productivity. First, an increase in capital-intensity in individual indus-
tries, that has associated with it an increase in labour productivity. And, second,
a faster rate of increase in the demand for and production of capital intensive
commodities, resulting in an increase in the share of capital intensive produc-
tion in the total. Our concern here is with the latter set of changes, as a result of
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Chart 4. Value Added Per Worker at Constant 1993-94 Prices: Organised Manufacturing
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
Table 7. Growth, Productivity and Capital Intensity
Rank Correlation Coefficient of Rate of Growth of Net Value Added with
Average Productivity 1993-94 to 1995-96 0.2
Productivity Growth 1993-94 to 2003-04 0.48
Average Capital-Labour Ratio 1993-94 to 1995-96 0.25
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
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shifts in the pattern of demand.
Therefore, Table 7 attempts to relate changes in product mix directly to
labour productivity. This it does by relating the ranks of individual three-digit
industries in terms of the rates of growth of net valued added with their ranks in
terms of Average productivity at the beginning of the period, Productivity
growth during 1993-94 and 2003-04 and Average capital intensity at the end of
the period (Capital intensity has been calculated using capital estimates based
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Table 8. Top 25 Industrial Categories in Terms of Rate of Growth of Labour Productivity
Industry Code RoG
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 352 76.6
Manufacture of coke oven products 231 48.3
Manufacture of watches and clocks 333 41.2
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 182 21.7
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for 322 21.4
line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of glass and glass products 261 20.9
Publishing 221 17.3
Manufacture of motor vehicles 341 15.1
Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c. 293 13.3
Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 319 13.0
Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and 281 8.8
steam generators
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 269 6.8
Manufacture of refined petroleum products 232 6.4
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311 6.4
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 300 6.1
Manufacture of rubber products 251 6.0
Manufacture of tobacco products 160 5.4
Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 171 4.6
Saw milling and planing of wood 201 4.3
Manufacture of paper and paper product 210 4.2
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 323 4.0
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods
Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 314 4.0
Manufacture of dairy products 152 3.5
Manufacture of man-made fibres 243 3.4
Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit vegetables, 151 3.1
oils and fats
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007).
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on the perpetual inventory accumulation method).
The figures do point to a significant, even if not overwhelmingly strong,
relationship between value added growth on the one hand and productivity
growth on the other, and a reasonable association between the output/value
added variables and average productivity and average capital intensity. Thus the
faster growing sectors substantially include those that are characterised by high-
er rates of growth of productivity and higher capital intensity.
Table 8 provides information on the top 25 3-digit sectors in terms of trend
rates of increase in labour productivity among those for which data is available.
It should be clear that they cover all of the sectors associated with the credit-
financed and inequality-driven household demand boom, suggesting that the
pattern of growth associated with the more open and liberalised regime of the
1990s has been significantly responsible for the extremely poor showing in
terms of employment growth of an otherwise buoyant organized manufactur-
ing sector. 
It is indeed true that conclusively establishing a direct link between the
process of growth, the pattern of demand and the stagnation in organized
employment is difficult. But the elements of evidence pieced together above do
suggest that the initial level of income and expenditure inequality, the increase
in that inequality, and the shift in the stimulus for growth from public expendi-
ture and investment to debt-financed private consumption and exports during
the liberalisation period has delivered a pattern of demand for manufactures
and a process of industrial growth that is biased in favour of capital intensive
sectors and technologies. Together with the factors encouraging increases in
capital intensity in individual sectors discussed elsewhere (Chandrasekhar,
2008), this is bound to have contributed to the tendency for organised sector
employment to stagnate even as production growth in the sector accelerates, or
to the phenomenon of “jobless growth.” 
This pattern of growth was accompanied by a significant shift in the distri-
bution of income in the organized sector that intensified the tendencies
described above. This was because the benefits of the labour productivity
increase went largely to those deriving rent, interest and profit incomes, rather
than workers. The share of wages in value added which was stable through
much of the 1980s (Chart 5) has been declining almost consistently since the
late 1980s till 1996-97 and then after a period of stability fell sharply to touch
less than half its mid 1990s level.
This was the result of two developments. The restructuring of the public
sector has meant that public sector manufacturing employment which was ris-
ing during the 1980s (Chart 6), was on the decline during the years of liberalisa-
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Chart 5. Ratio of Wages to Net Value Added in Organised Manufacturing
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007). 
Chart 6. Organised Sector Employment (Hundreds of thousands)
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance (1985; 1991; 2001; 2005). 
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tion and fell particularly sharply after 1997. Private organised manufacturing
employment which was stagnant during the 1980s, rose marginally during the
early 1990s and particularly sharply during 1995-97, after which it has declined
to return to its mid-1990s level by 2003. In the event, aggregate (public and pri-
vate) organised manufacturing employment rose from 6.1 million in 1981 to 6.4
million in 1994 and 6.9 million in 1997, and then declined sharply to 6 million
in 2003.
The second development of significance is that the average real wage of
workers in the organised manufacturing sector has been more or less constant
right through the 1990s (Chart 7). That is, the relative price of capital with
respect to labour has shifted in favour of capital not because workers are being
paid high and rising real wages, but because the prices of capital goods have
been reduced and kept cheap as part of the policy of facilitating private invest-
ment.
Together, the above two developments have ensured that the benefits of the
rise in labour productivity have largely gone to the surplus earners in the organ-
ised manufacturing sector, who have been the main beneficiaries of the policies
of liberalisation in general and trade liberalisation in particular.
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Chart 7. Average Annual Real Wage Per Worker: Organised Manufacturing
Source: Computed from data available from the Central Statistical Organization’s Annual Survey
of Industries collated in EPW Research Foundation (2007); EPWRF and Reserve Bank of India
(2009).
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Thus, the recent boom was fundamentally dependent upon greater global
integration, which also made the growth process more uneven and more vul-
nerable to internally and externally generated crises. It is commonly perceived
that this reflected the impact of trade liberalisation, but in fact changes in
finance were probably more significant, in ways elaborated above. Essentially,
recent growth was related to financial deregulation that sparked a retail credit
boom and combined with fiscal concessions to spur consumption among the
richest quintile of the population. This led to rapid increases in aggregate GDP
growth, even as deflationary fiscal policies, poor employment generation and
persistent agrarian crisis kept mass consumption demand low. The substantial
rise in profit shares in the economy and the proliferation of financial activities
(which together with real estate accounted for nearly 15 per cent of GDP in
2007-08) combined with rising asset values to enable a credit-financed con-
sumption splurge among the rich and the middle classes especially in urban
areas, which in turn generated higher rates of investment and output over the
upswing. The earlier emphasis on public spending as the principal stimulus for
growth was thus substituted in the 1990s with debt-financed housing invest-
ment and private consumption of the elite and burgeoning middle classes. The
recent Indian growth story in its essentials was therefore not unlike the story of
speculative bubble-led expansion that marked the experience of several other
developed and developing countries in the same period. 
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